Before September 11, 2001, U.S. intelligence officials had several warnings of possible attack by terrorists on the United States soil -- even attacks by airplanes. Two congressional committees stated this in their report ofSept. 18, 2002.

A joint inquiry of House and Senate intelligence committees reported that, in 1998, U.S. intelligence obtained information that some unidentified Arabs were planning to fly an airplane with explosives into the World Trade Center Towers. However, the FDA (Federal Aviation Administration) executives decided that this plot was "highly unlikely given the state of that foreign country's aviation program". They also argued that any flight originating outside the United States could be detected before reaching its target inside the country. So, "The FBI's New York office took no action on the information".

The report also stated that another warning ocurred one month before the 9/11 Attack. This was a CIA message to the FAA a possible hijacking "or an act of sabotage against a commercial airliner." The information cited some Pakistanis in South America. This message did not mention use of an airliner as their weapon. And the Congressional report stated, "there was apparently little, if any, effort by intelligence community analysts to produce any strategic assessments of terrorists using aircraft as weapons."

Sen. Bob Graham, chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee, releasing this report, said that they found no "smoking gun," Graham said. "But collectively I think there was enough there that we should have done a better job of seeing what was coming and hopefully, with luck, stopping it." Graham told CNN "It wouldn't have taken a lot of luck. It would have taken someone who could have asked and gotten answers to the right follow-up questions and then put it together."

This congressional report, concerning more than a dozen federal intelligence agencies, suggests the United States had even more information wich might have helped to prevent the terror attacks than the government has previously admitted.

The reports states that, back in 1994 the Government possessed information that international terrorists "seriously considered the use of airplanes as a means ofcarrying out terrorist attacks".

The report states that, in July 2001 (shortly before the 9/11 Attack), a briefing for senior Government officials warned of "a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties ... (it) will occur with little or no warning."

The joint committee's report said that, in 1998, officials received reports concerning a "bin Laden plot involving aircraft in the New York and Washington, areas." Officials received reports that al Qaeda was trying to establish a US operative cell to recruit a five to seven young men from the United States to travel to the Middle East for training in coodination with Bin Lade's plans to strike U.S. domestic targets. However, this intelligence "generally did not contain specific information as to where, when, and how a terrorist attack might occur". And the committee said these messages represented only "a small percentage of the threat information that the Intelligence Community obtained during this period, most of which pointed to the possibility of attacks against U.S. interests overseas." But "the totality of the information in this body of reporting clearly reiterated a consistent and critically important theme: Osama bin Laden's intent to launch terrorist attacks inside the United States."

The Congressinal report states that, in December 1998, CIA Director, George Tenet, told deputies, "We must now enter a new phase in our effort against bin Laden. ... We are at war." But, "Relatively few of the FBI agents interviewed by the joint inquiry staff seem to have been aware of Tenet's declaration".

The Committee found that, in July and August 2001, intelligence reporting "began to decrease" -- even though the al Qaeda threat was growing. On September 10, 2001, 35-40 personnel were assigned to a unit created by the CIA director with the specific task of tracking bin Laden. Fewer than 20 FBI people were similarly assigned -- raising "questions about the adequacy of these resources with respect to the magnitude of the threat." The report suggests intelligence officials did not focus enough attention on a critical al Qaeda operative (unnamed in the report) about whom officials had known about around 1995 without recognizing "his growing importance" to the organization or to Osama bin Laden.

The report states that the CIA Director has refused to declassify two pieces of information: (1)precisely what the White House knew, and (1) information about a key al Qaeda operative involved in the attacks.

Government sources told CNN that operative is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, described as one of the masterminds of the September 11 attacks. In 1995 Kalid was indicted by the United States for plotting to bomb U.S. airliners. Officials believe he also plotted (in 1995) to have airplanes hijacked and flown into U.S. buildings.

Listed as one of the government's 22 most wanted terrorists, Mohammed is in hiding. U.S. officials believe he was in Pakistan when last heard from.

Stephen Push, who lost his wife in the World Trade Center, was present at this Congressinal hearing. He told lawmakers at the hearing, "Our loved ones paid the ultimate price for the worst American intelligence failure since Pearl Harbor.

Push said the U.S. intelligence bureaucracy must be thoroughly restructured. "If it isn't," he said, "the next attack may involve weapons of mass destruction -- and the death toll may be in the tens of thousands or even hundreds of thousands."